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1.1 Introduction to the problem, research question 
and relevance 
This thesis analyses cyber-attacks as a means of war. More concretely, the issue raised in this 
thesis is if, and when, cyber-attacks can constitute a breach of “use of force” in Article 2(4) of 
the United Nations (UN) Charter. The thesis will focus on the application of cyber-attacks by 
States that target other States. 
The UN Charter was created as a result of the Second World War, and thus the prohibition on 
the use of force was directed at classic and weapons known at the time. The breakthrough of 
the internet changed the rules for many industries, and war is no exception. With the 
development of cyber combat, far from the traditional concept of conventional weapons and 
explosives, cyberspace has become a new domain for military operations. Today, wars are 
fought at sea, on land, in the air, across space and in the emerging battleground of cyberspace. 
In modern society, we are heavily reliant on technology and the increased digitalisation of 
society means that vulnerability to hateful intrusions has also grown. This has made the use of 
digital weapons a rising global problem. The vulnerabilities can range between an individual 
level with stolen personal information to state-level with larger political motivated digital 
attacks. 
Cyber-attacks can be a serious threat to national security, and as a result, States and academics 
are beginning to treat cyber-attacks as acts of war. However, cyber combat does not look like 
the historic perception of what constitutes war, and this creates an issue in regard to the 
regulations monitoring armed conflicts. Traditionally, the law of war has mainly been 
regulated by treaties, international customary law and fundamental principles. Key principles 
in humanitarian law include the need for military necessity,1 a distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants2 and proportionality between the harmed caused and the expected 
military advantage.3 
                                               
1 International Committee of the Red Cross (2009) Rule 70 
2 International Committee of the Red Cross (2009) Rule 1 




With the rise of opportunities connected to technology, both practitioners and scholars 
acknowledge that cyber warfare plays by new rules. And the rules are not necessarily fair: 
cyber combat does not usually distinguish between States and private individuals or 
corporations as targets. The perpetrators of the attack often do not care about the harm caused. 
Further, the attacks are often even conducted by the military of another State and can be 
committed by anyone with internet access.  
In February 2018, UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated that 
“When one looks at today’s cyberspace, it is clear that we are witnessing, in a more or 
less disguised way, cyberwars between States - episodes of cyberwar between States.  
 
The fact that is we have not yet been able to discuss whether or not the Geneva 
Conventions apply to cyberwar or whether or not international humanitarian law 
applies to cyberwar.”4 
 
So far, no State has claimed to be targeted with “use of force” or be under “armed attack”5 of 
the cyber forces from another State. This thesis questions if, and when, cyber-attacks become 
“use of force”, as stipulated in the UN Charter? 
1.2 Terminology 
There is no definite legal definition of what a cyber operation or a cyber-attack is. However, 
there have been many attempts to define the term, both by the military of various States and 
by academics. The Tallinn Manual6 defines overall cyber-operations as “[w]hether offensive 
or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or 
destruction to objects”.7 Merriam Webster defines a cyber-attack as “[a]n attempt to gain 
illegal access to a computer or computer system for the purpose of causing damage or harm”.8 
Additionally, the United States Army defines it as “[t]he premeditated use of disruptive 
activities, or the threat thereof, against computer and/or networks, with the intention to cause 
harm or to further social, ideological, religious, political or similar objectives, or to intimidate 
                                               
4 Guterres (2018) 
5 UN Charter Article 51 
6 a non-binding, academic study on how international law applies to cyber operations, read more under section 
1.4 
7 Tallinn Manual (2017) Rule 92 




any person in furtherance of such objectives”.9 Meanwhile, the German Cyber Security 
Strategy defines a cyber-attack as “[a]n IT attack in cyberspace directed against one or several 
other IT systems and aimed at damaging IT security – confidentiality, integrity and 
availability – which may all or individually be compromised”.10 Lastly, Waxman defines 
cyber-attacks as “[e]fforts to alter, disrupt, or destroy computer systems or networks or the 
information or programs on them”.11  
It is clear that the definition laid out by the Tallinn Manual is not limited to software only. 
The definition by Merriam Webster does not seem to distinguish between unsuccessful and 
successful attempts, and it states that the attack has to have an intention behind it, without 
mentioning what these intentions may entail. The American definition goes further by laying 
out a set of intentions behind the attack. This way, the definition only applies to attacks falling 
within the mentioned intentions and, accordingly, delimitates towards other intentions. The 
definition laid out by Waxman, together with the United States Army definition, both open up 
for including threats and efforts at an attack. Finally, it is worth mentioning that cyber is 
highly influenced by geopolitics. Due to the variation in definitions of what a cyber-attack is, 
this thesis defines cyber-attack as the following. 
There are three main segments of cyber operations: cyber-crime, cyber-attack and cyber 
warfare.12 In order to properly define the segments, it is important to distinguish between 
them.   
Figure 1: Cyber operations13 
                                               
9 US Army Training & Doctrine Command (2005) section VII-2 
10 German Federal Ministry of the Interior (2011) pp.14-15 
11 Waxman (2011) pp. 421-422 
12 Hathaway (2012) p. 834 

















Cyber-crime is understood as the use of computer-based means to commit an illegal act 
conducted only by non-State actors.14 For example, committing crimes by using a computer 
system, computer network or hardware device.15 Cyber-crime thus comprises a broad variety 
of illegal activities, for instance, online piracy, storage and sharing of child pornography and 
computer intrusions. This means that cyber-crime is committed by individuals without any 
political or national purpose and are often illegal under national and/or international law. 
Cyber-attacks may be conducted by either State or non-State actors. They must involve active 
conduct and aim to undermine the function of a computer network with a political or national 
security purpose.16 It is clear from Figure 1 that some cyber-attacks are neither cyber-crime or 
cyber-warfare, and two scenarios fall within this category. The first scenario is when a cyber-
attack outside the context of an armed attack, is carried out by a State actor, provided its 
effects do not rise to the level of an armed attack. It would still have to fulfil all elements of a 
cyber-attack, such as undermining the function of a computer network for a political or 
national security purpose. The Chinese governments attack on the Falun Gong website in 
2011 falls into this category.17 The second scenario is when a cyber-attack is conducted by 
non-State actors and it does not rise to the level of an armed attack and does not constitute a 
cyber-crime.  This may be because the act is not criminalised under national or international 
law, or because they do not use computer-based means.18 Since there are gaps in criminal law, 
this is possible. As this thesis limited to State vs. State actors, only the former scenario will be 
reviewed. 
Cyber-warfare is distinctive because it must also constitute a cyber-attack. The overlap 
between cyber-attack and cyber-crime in the figure entails two types of attacks. First, cyber-
attacks carried out by any actor in the context of armed conflict, provided that those actions 
could not be considered as cyber-crimes. This is either because they do not use computer-
based means or they do not constitute war crimes or both. Second, a cyber-attack carried out 
by a State actor with effects equivalent to those of a conventional “armed attack”.19 In sum, 
                                               
14 Hathaway (2012) pp. 833-4 
15 Gordon (2006) p. 14 
16 Hathaway (2012) p. 836 
17 Hathaway (2012) p. 835 
18 Hathaway (2012) p. 835 




not all cyber-attacks are cyber-warfare and only cyber-attacks with effects equivalent to those 
of a conventional “armed attack”, or occurring with the context of armed conflict, reaches the 
necessary threshold. 
The small, overlapping area between all three kinds of attack in the figure will not be 
elaborated because this is scenarios carried out by a non-State actor. 
1.3 Delimitation of the research question 
The scope of this thesis will be delimited in several ways. Firstly, this study is limited to State 
vs. State cyber-attack scenarios only. The reason is that international armed conflicts (IACs) 
constitute a well-regulated area of international law and these rules have been further studied 
and developed, also when it comes to cyber operations. 
Second, this thesis will be delimitated to the study of cyber-attacks, and therefore will not 
explore the legal area of cyber-defence or other forms of cyber operations. This is because it 
is not possible within the scope of this thesis to evaluate other forms of cyber operations.  
This thesis will also focus on jus ad bellum and will not analyse jus in bello. This focus means 
that this thesis will not evaluate what would be the correct responses to the use of force 
conducted by cyber-attacks. 
Finally, cyber-attacks are a fast-developing area and this thesis will, therefore, be limited to 
the knowledge that was available 20. April 2019. 
1.4 Methodology 
The main methodological challenge with this thesis is that there is currently no international 
law regulating the field of cyber operations. To attempt to overcome this gap, an international 
group of approximately twenty experts met at the invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) and created the Tallinn Manual – a non-binding, 
academic study on how international law applies to cyber operations. The Tallinn Manual was 
published by Cambridge University Press in 2013 and focuses especially on jus ad bellum. 
Accordingly, the Tallinn Manual is an essential source in this thesis. In February 2017, the 
Cambridge University Press published the Tallinn Manual 2.0. The successor is designed to 




Building on the understandings of the Tallinn Manual 2.0, this thesis will also rely on 
extensive literature analysis. Cyber operations are a relatively new legal area with rapid 
developments and challenges, yet, there are already some prominent researchers in the field.  
To finish, it is worth mentioning that this field is highly influenced by geopolitics and within 
a legal area in rapid development. The cyber strategies of each State are designed to ensure 
the States’ interests and it is also possible to draw a line between the State’s cyber strategy 
and their warfare history.  
1.5 The structure of the thesis 
Due to the complexities in this thesis in regard to the technical terms, it will start by giving an 
introduction to cyber operations. This will consist of an explanation of how a cyber-attack is 
carried out before it is explained who can be considered as involved when it is only state 
actors. 
This thesis will then turn to the main focus, which is Article 2(4) of the UN Charter in regard 
to cyber-attack. First, there will be an examination of the concept “use of force” in Article 
2(4) before moving on to an analysis of “use of force” in relation to cyber-attack. After this, 
there will be a concrete analysis of two cases where cyber-attack led to very different results. 






2 An introduction to cyber operations 
2.1 How 
There are different ways to conduct cyber-operations, both offensive and defensive. Most 
cyber agencies run by States, such as the Norwegian Cyber Defence,20 use the Cyber Kill 
Chain framework. This model was developed by Lockheed Martin and functions as the 
methodology for identifying and understanding how an attacker will try to cause harm in 
order to prevent it. A Kill Chain is a “[s]ystematic process to target and engage an adversary 
to create desired effects”.21 The method gives the defender an advantage by knowing its 
opponent’s next move.  
The Kill Chain consists of seven steps, and in order to demonstrate the model properly, the 
explanation will in the following focus on the attacker’s point of view.  
First, in the reconnaissance stage, the attacker conducts research by assessing the potential 
target from outside the organisation.22 This research is both technical and non-technical, and 
the attacker may visit websites such as conference proceedings and mailing lists for social 
relationships or information of a specific technology.23 The attacker works to determine 
which target will return the most asset for the resources consumed in manipulating the target’s 
systems.   
Second, the weaponization stage. The attacker develops a malware that is specifically 
designed to exploit the vulnerabilities already discovered during the previous step.24  
Third, the delivery stage involves transmitting the malware from the attacker to the targeted 
system for exploitation.25 The most used delivery vector observed by Lockheed Martin for the 
years 2004-2010 are websites, USB removable data and email attachments,26 and a cyber-
attack is most likely to target an internal employee of an organisation.27 
                                               
20 See for instance Nikolaisen (2016) 
21 Hutchins (undated) 
22 Death (2018) 
23 Hutchins (undated) 
24 Hutchins (undated) 
25 Death (2018) 
26 Hutchins (undated) 




Fourth, during the exploitation phase, the malware is delivered to the targeted victim and the 
execution can start.28 The attacker takes advantage of the discovered vulnerabilities in the 
system to gain superuser access to the information system.29 
Fifth, in the installation stage the malware installs itself onto the targeted information 
system,30 and by doing this, it has created a backdoor. Now it can download additional 
software if network access is possible. This allows the malware to stay small and 
undetectable.31 
Sixth, during the command and control (C2) stage, the attacker has put in place their 
management and communication code onto the targeted network.32 This gives the attacker the 
possibility to have “hands on the keyboard” access inside the system,33 just like regular 
employees. 
Seventh, the action on objectives stage where an attacker can take actions to achieve their 
original goals.34 This might include collecting and extracting information, destruction of the 
information systems35 or DDoS, which is coordinated botnets (“zombie” computers) hijacked 







                                               
28 Hutchins (undated) 
29 Death (2018) 
30 Hutchins (undated) 
31 Death (2018) 
32 Death (2018) 
33 Hutchins (undated) 
34 Hutchins (undated) 
35 Death (2018) 

























Figure 2: Cyber Kill Chain37  
                                               


















During a cyber-attack, finding out who your enemy is could be one of the hardest tasks. The 
International Group of Experts agree that the customary international law of State 
responsibility undeniably extends to cyber activities.38 As a result, three different scenarios 
referring to the right of States have been identified by various academics. 
First, is the case of “uniformed” hackers. It is widely known that several States have 
developed their own cyber units within their national army. For instance, Norway has its own 
Cyber Defence,39 China has a Strategic Support Force,40 the US-appointed its first cyber 
warfare general almost a decade ago,41 Israel is investing heavily in its Cyber unit in the 
Israeli Defence Force,42 and in finally, Germany has its own Cyber unit.43 This scenario will 
be included further in this thesis. 
Second, the law of State responsibility also applies to cyber-attacks conducted by a non-State 
actor if the State factually exercises “effective control” over that specific conduct of the non-
State actor.44 This includes individuals or corporations hired by States to conduct cyber-
attacks on the State’s behalf. However, when can the actions by individuals or corporations be 
associated with the State? According to the International Law Commission (ILC) treaty on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts Article 8, “[t]he conduct of a 
person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the 
Person or group of persons, is in fact, acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or 
control of, that State in carrying out the conduct”.45  
In the Nicaragua case, the Court was able to clarify that when State A gives assistance to 
rebels seeking to overthrow the government of State B, this assistance to the rebels may be 
indirect use of force contrary to customary international law. The evaluation must be based on 
the kind of assistance provided by State A to the rebels.46 In the Nicaragua case, the court 
considered it was sufficient that the United States armed and trained the rebels.47 In the 
                                               
38 Tallinn Manual (2017) p. 80 
39 Forsvaret (undated) 
40 Lyall (2018) 
41 Beaumont (2010)  
42 VICE News (2018) 
43 DW News (2018) 
44 Tallinn Manual (2017) Rule 17 
45 International Law Commission Article 8 
46 Nicaragua v. United States of America para 228 




International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY), in the case of Tadić, the Court 
declared that “[t]he degree of control may (…) vary according to the factual circumstances of 
each case”.48 Further, the Court expressed in their concluding assessment that when the 
actions of individuals and corporations can be tied to the State, the State “has a role in 
organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to 
financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that group (…) 
regardless of any specific instruction by the controlling State concerning the commission of 
each of those acts”.49 One example is the Russian Business Network, a firm specialising in 
identity thefts, malicious malware, phishing and botnet command-and-control, suspected of 
executing the attacks towards Georgia.50 This scenario will also be developed further in this 
thesis. 
The final scenario is not attributable to the state so it will not be developed further in this 
thesis. Briefly, it involves hackers whose conduct has been encouraged by State agents, for 
example, by emails, chat rooms and websites. This means that they are neither de jure nor de 
facto State organs. One example is from 2001 when a U.S. Navy spy plane collided with a 
Chinese jet fighter in the South China Sea, and websites appeared to be offering instructions 
to hackers on how they could cripple U.S. government computers.51 
One of the main problems with cyber operations concerns the identification of the origin of 
the attack, and this is also one of the main obstacles when applying Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter. For the purpose of this thesis, however, it will be assumed that a cyber operation has 
been attributed to a State actor, as demonstrated in this subchapter. 
                                               
48 Prosecutor v. Tadić para 117 
49 Prosecutor v. Tadić para 137 
50 Roscini (2010) p.100 




3 UN Charter Article 2(4) – “use of force” 
3.1 General 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that 
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.” 
 
The prohibition of using force is seen as a pillar in international law, and it calls for the 
Members of the UN to refrain from “threat or use of force” against the territorial integrity and 
political independence of any State, the values particularly protected by the Charter.52 The UN 
Charter does not provide a definition or criteria of “threat or use of force” and therefore it is 
important to examine what lies in the wording of “force”. The general criteria for the 
interpretation of treaties is described in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
and it states that a treaty shall be interpreted in “good faith” in accordance with the “ordinary 
meaning” to the terms of the treaty in the “context and light” of its “object and purpose”.53 
The wording of the term “force” is ambiguous, and in light of the literal criteria and context, 
the results are inconclusive. In Black’s Law Dictionary, “force” is defined as “[p]ower, 
violence or pressure directed against a person or thing”.54 This definition implies that “force” 
can entail a variety of actions, including measures of economic and political coercion.55 By 
looking at the context of the term, it is also used in the Preamble of the UN Charter, as well as 
in Articles 41 and 46 where it is preceded by the adjective “armed”. On the other hand, in 
Article 44, the reference is clearly to armed force only because it is stated. This distinction 
between armed force and force in the UN Charter may imply that the drafters wanted to 
separate the two and that they, therefore, wanted to refer to a broader notion of force in 
Article 2(4).  
However, the Preamble of the UN Charter states that its overall purpose is to “[s]ave 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war”, not to ban all forms of coercion. This 
                                               
52 Asrat (1991) p. 47 
53 Vienna Convention Article 31(1) 
54 Garner (1999) p. 673 




supports a narrow understanding of the provision, resulting in a limitation to military force 
only. It strengthens this understanding of the term by examining several UN General 
Assembly resolutions, such as the Declaration on Friendly Relations, which states that 
political and economic coercion shall not be considered as an aspect of the use of “force”, but 
rather of the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs of another State.56 Despite the 
fact that the resolutions are non-binding documents,57 the various resolutions may be seen as 
relevant to the interpretation as “subsequent practice” of the UN Member States.58 Further, a 
proposal by Brazil to extend the prohibition on force to also include economic coercion was 
explicitly rejected at the San Francisco Conference.59 In sum, the ordinary meaning, drafting 
history and relevant UN documents imply that the “use of force” is limited to military force 
only. 
Today it is principally undisputed that the prohibition on the use of force is considered jus 
cogens. The status means that no State can contract out of the obligation to refrain from the 
use of force.60 The status as jus cogens was first confirmed in the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) case Nicaragua in 1986. The case started in 1979 when the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (the Sandinista) overthrew the regime, leading opponents of the new 
Sandinista regime to flee to the United States in order to organise themselves as the 
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (the Contras).61 Two years later, the Sandinista supported 
armed groups in El Salvador and Ronald Reagan, the sitting President of the United States at 
the time, chose to stop all American aid to Nicaragua because the United States had good 
relations to El Salvador.62 Further, Nicaragua allowed the Soviet Union to pass arms through 
their ports and territory on the way to El Salvador, which created another layer to the already 
tense Cold War. Nicaragua made a claim to the ICJ in April 1984. 
The ICJ ruled, inter alia, that the United States had violated the prohibition of the use of force 
under customary international law and the obligation to refrain from intervention in 
Nicaragua’s sovereignty.63 In detail, the Court decided that the United States breached its 
obligation under international humanitarian law not to intervene in the affairs of another State 
                                               
56 UN General Assembly A/RES/25/2625 Declaration on Friendly Relations 
57 UN Charter Article 10 
58 Ziolkowski (2012) pp.7-8 
59 Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organisation (1945) pp.334 
60 Weller (2015) p. 17 
61 Tsagourias (1996) 
62 Harris (2010) p. 727 




by training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the Contras,64 but the actions were 
not together considered as “threat or use of force”. Although financial support given to the 
Contras by the United States was an established fact, the Court could not comply with itself 
that the United States “created” the Contras, nor that they gave “direct and critical combat 
support” in the sense that this support was identical to a direct intervention by the United 
States military forces, or that all operations carried out by the Contras reflected strategy and 
tactics constructed by the United States.65 However, the Court found that certain attacks 
conducted by the United States in the Nicaraguan territory between 1983-1984 were clearly to 
be considered as use of force, such as laying out mines.66  
It is generally accepted that Jean S. Pictet's "scope, duration and intensity" criteria can be used 
as a starting point for an analysis to identify and classify the degree of use of force. This was 
also confirmed by the ICJ when it stated that the scale and effects are to be considered when 
determining whether a use of force amounts to an armed attack,67 and it drew a distinction 
between an armed attack and a mere frontier incident.68 This means that the attack shall be 
evaluated after its scale and effects whether it is a “use of force” or if it reaches the threshold 
of an “armed attack”. Once the use of force reaches the threshold of an armed attack, it 
triggers the right to individual and collective self-defence.69 
3.2 Cyber-attacks and “use of force” 
This sub-chapter will build on the previous section to discuss how the UN Charter’s 
provisions on the use of force apply to cyber operations before it explores if and when a cyber 
operation reaches the threshold of use of force and becomes prohibited under Article 2(4). 
According to the Tallinn Manual Rule 68, “a cyber operation that constitutes a threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or that is in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, is unlawful”. As 
mentioned, this thesis will only address cyber-attack, but this understanding is still in line 
with the States obligations under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.  
                                               
64 Nicaragua v. United States of America para. 292 
65 Harris (2010) p. 733 
66 Nicaragua v. United States of America para. 228 
67 Nicaragua v. United States of America para. 195 
68 Nicaragua v. United States of America para. 195 




Following the wording of Article 2(4), in order for this Article to apply to cyber-attack, three 
conditions must be met.70 First, the cyber-attack needs to be attributed to a State. As 
mentioned in section 2.1, this must either be cyber units within a national army, or individuals 
or corporations hired by States to conduct a cyber-attack on the State’s behalf. This excludes 
private individuals encouraged by State agents. Second, the cyber-attack must reach the 
threshold of either a “threat” or “use of force”. Finally, the threat or use of force must be put 
to use in the manner of “international relations”.71 This requires that the threat or use of force 
must not only be conducted by a State actor, but also against another State. Accordingly, 
States are not prohibited by Article 2(4) to threaten or resort to a cyber-attack against 
individuals or groups not connected to a State. This also applies if they amount to a threat or 
use of force, as long as such attacks do not affect another State’s territorial integrity or 
political independence.72 The territorial integrity is tied to any intervention, direct or indirect, 
in the affairs of a State, meanwhile, political independence is connected with people’s right to 
self-determination, freedom and independence.73  
Further, the International Group of Experts elaborated on this when by stating that cyber-
attack “constitutes a use of force when its scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber-
attacks rising to the level of a use of force”.74 This means that one must look at conventional 
attacks that reach the required threshold to understand which criteria a cyber-attack has to 
meet to be considered as use of force. 
Since the “use of force” is traditionally limited to military force only, it must first be 
examined if and when a cyber-attack becomes the use of military force. 
A natural understanding of the term “military forces” is the armed forces of a State. This is in 
line with Merriam Webster’s definition.75 
Further, the Black’s Law Dictionary states that “armed” implies”[e]quipped with a weapon” 
or “[i]nvolving the use of a weapon”,76 and this would be in line with the ordinary meaning of 
the expression. There is no binding definition of “weapon” in the jus ad bellum instruments, 
                                               
70 Roscini (2014) p. 44 
71 UN Charter Article 2(4) 
72 Roscini (2014) p. 44 
73 UN General Assembly A/RES/25/2625 Declaration on Friendly Relations 
74 Tallinn Manual (2017) Rule 69 
75 Merriam Webster (undated B) 




but the Black’s Law Dictionary states that is “[a]n instrument used or designed to be used to 
injure or kill someone”.77 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defined that 
weapons are “[m]eans to commit acts of violence against human or material enemy forces”.78 
What is common for both definitions is that they state that it must be involved in an 
instrument meant to create violent consequences. 
The question is then, is Article 2(4) limited to military armed force, or does it extend to cover 
physical force of a non-military nature? To illustrate what is meant here, one may imagine the 
White Nile section of the River Nile. The Nile has been essential for life in these countries for 
centuries and is still important today in order to avoid drought. It starts in the Victoria Lake in 
Uganda, continues through South Sudan and Sudan before it enters Egypt and finally flows 
into the Mediterranean Sea. But, imagine that Uganda decides to create a dam in order to 
make the river stop, leaving Egypt without the Nile. It is reasonable to assume that the action 
has intentions to influence the territorial integrity of Egypt, but it is clear that there was no 
military use of force involved.  
Randelzhofer argues that this kind of situation can only be accepted within narrow limits and 
acknowledges that physical force can affect a State just as severely as the use of military 
force.79 Nonetheless, the purpose behind Article 2(4), as stated in the article itself, is to ban 
means of coercion. This is further confirmed in the Preamble of the UN Charter where it is 
stated that the purpose is to “[s]ave succeeding generations from the scourge of war”.80 The 
illegal use of force would also, under normal circumstances, follow from other rules, such as 
the principles of territorial integrity or non-intervention.  
However, the ICJ gave a clear statement that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter in its Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons: “[weapons] does not refer to specific 
weapons. They apply to any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed.”. The ICJ also 
expressed that a weapon does not have to be explosive, which would be the case of most 
biological weapons.81 In sum, this means that a weapon, independent of composition, can be 
used as a military force. This is supported by the fact that several States have included cyber 
                                               
77 Garner (1999) p. 1730 
78 Henckaerts (2013) p. 49 
79 Randelzhofer (2002) p. 119 
80 UN Charter Preamble 




operations as a part of their national military strategy, as previously mentioned in section 2.1. 
It is therefore acceptable to say that a cyber-attack can be considered as a weapon. 
After the turn of the millennium, the debate about when cyber-attack should be considered to 
reach the threshold of “use of force” started to grow. Three approaches are developed by 
researchers in order to address the issue and attempt to make cyber-attack conform to jus ad 
bellum norms. Whether or not cyber-attack is considered as “use of force” depends ultimately 
on which of the three analytical approaches is applied.  
The instrument-based approach focuses on the means used to conduct an act and has 
traditionally been employed to distinguish armed force from economic and political 
coercion.82 However, this approach has received criticism for being centred on instruments 
that are defined by their physical characteristics. Further criticism is levelled at this approach 
because under this view, it has been claimed that the approach cannot be applied on digital 
codes and that it would lead to the conclusion that cyber-attack never can be considered as 
“use of force” under Article 2(4)83 and that a cyber-attack will only be considered as “use of 
force” if it uses traditional military weapons.84  
The target-based approach argues that cyber-attacks reach the threshold of the use of armed 
force when they are conducted against national critical infrastructure, whatever their effects 
may be.85 This means that a cyber-attack only needs to deliver malware, as explained in step 3 
in Figure 2 and penetrate a critical system to justify a conventional military response.86 
Further, this approach is in line with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter by focusing on the 
targeted infrastructure. This will be important for both the territorial integrity and political 
independence of the attacked State. Nonetheless, this approach has been criticised for being 
overinclusive in that it would also qualify as a use of force those cyber operations that only 
cause inconvenience or merely aim to collect information whenever they target a national 
critical infrastructure. Further, there is no generally accepted definition of what constitutes a 
national critical infrastructure.87 
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Finally, the approach with the most support is the effects-based approach. It classifies a cyber-
attack as an armed force based on the gravity of its actions.88 Thus, any cyber-attack that 
causes or is reasonably likely to cause the damaging consequences normally produced by 
kinetic weapons would be a use of armed force.89 This understanding is in line with the scale 
and effects statement in the Nicaragua case and Rule 69 in the Tallinn Manual.90 
In the absence of a conclusive definite threshold, the International Group of Experts has taken 
notice of the effects-based approach. The Tallinn Manual states that this approach was chosen 
because it is intended to identify cyber-attack that are analogous to other non-kinetic or 
kinetic actions that the international community would describe as use of force.91 On this 
basis, the effects-based approach will be used further in this thesis. 
The effects-based approach was originally developed by Michael Schmitt, and he further 
developed factors to be used by States while they make use of force assessments. Both the 
Group of Experts and Schmitt have highlighted that the following factors are not formal legal 
criteria, but they can contribute to the evaluation of the scale and effect of a cyber-attack, as 
stated in the Nicaragua case and the Tallinn Manual. 
a) Severity. A cyber-attack that “[s]eriously injures or kills a number of persons or that 
causes significant damage to, or destruction of, property” would satisfy the 
requirement of scale and effects.92 Smaller inconvenience or irritation will, however, 
never reach the threshold.  Between these two extremes, the more consequences 
infringe on critical national interest, as stated in Article 2(4), the more they will 
contribute to the portrayal of a cyber-attack as use of force. It is in line with 
international customary law that the scope, intensity and duration of the consequences 
have a great impact on this factor also while evaluating the cyber-attack.93 In line with 
the Nicaragua case, the severity of a cyber-attack is the most significant factor in the 
analysis. 
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b) Immediacy. If the consequences of an act are revealed sooner, then, States have fewer 
opportunities to seek peaceful solutions of a dispute. Therefore, States harbour a 
greater concern for immediate consequences than those that are delayed or build 
slowly over time. For this reason, States are more likely to characterise a cyber-attack 
that produces immediate results as a use of force than cyber-attack that take weeks or 
months to achieve their intended effects.94 
c) Directness. The more times passes between the initial act and its consequences, the 
less likely it is that States will deem the actor in violation of the prohibition on the use 
of force.95 In armed conflicts, cause and effect are highly related to one another. For 
instance, a bomb explosion directly harms people and objects. Meanwhile, with 
economic sanctions, it may take weeks or longer to have an effect on market forces 
and so on. This means that cyber-attack with a direct effect is more likely to be 
labelled as the use of force.96 
d) Invasiveness. This factor refers to the degree to which cyber-attack intrude into the 
target State. This means that the more secure a targeted system is, the greater is the 
concern as to its penetration. The degree to which the intended effects of a cyber-
attack are limited to a particular State increases the perceived invasiveness of those 
attacks.97 One example is domain names, which is a visible marker in cyberspace of 
belonging (e.g. “forsvaret.no”). Cyber-attack directly targeted towards the domain 
name of a specific State or State organ will be considered as more invasive.  
e) Measurability of effects. This factor developed from the greater willingness of States 
to characterise actions as the use of force if the consequences are visible.98 Ordinarily, 
the armed forces of a State carry out operations that are easy to label as the use of 
force and the effects of the operations are mainly measurable. However, with cyber-
attack, this factor is less apparent. Consequently, a cyber-attack that can be evaluated 
in specific terms (e.g. number of servers disabled, the percentage of confidential files 
stolen) is more likely to be characterised as the use of force.99 
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f) Military character. If there is a connection between the cyber-attack in question and 
military operations, it enhances the likelihood of characterisation as a use of force.100 
This also has support in the UN Charter, where both the Preamble and several 
articles101 refer to the use of [armed] force as in the use of military force. 
Traditionally, the use of force has also been understood to imply force engaged by 
armed forces. For instance, a cyber-attack conducted to cripple a military’s 
communication system, and because of this, the State has reduced or lost its ability to 
conduct and sustain military operations.102 
g) State involvement. The clearer the nexus between a State and cyber-attack, the more 
likely it is that other States will characterise them as uses of force by that State.103  
h) Presumptive legality. International law is often positive: acts that are not forbidden are 
allowed. This means that in absence of a treaty or accepted international customary 
law, the act is presumptively legal. At this point, international law does not prohibit 
propaganda nor mere economic pressure per se. Therefore, these acts are 
presumptively legal. 
These factors are not exhaustive. To evaluate whether a cyber-attack reaches the threshold of 
use of force, States may also look to other factors, such as the political environment, the 
identity of the attacker, whether the cyber-attack portends future use of military force, the 
nature of the target, and any record of cyber-attack by the attacker in the past.104  
Since cyber-attack consists of a broad variety of actions, ranging from simply gathering 
information and surveillance to disrupting, deleting and completely crashing networks and 
destroying other connected equipment, this thesis will in the following try to draw out the 
lower threshold of what constitutes a use of force within cyber-attacks by looking at the 
different typologies. 
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3.3 Evaluation of the threshold 
3.3.1 Cyber-attack causing physical damage to property, loss of life, 
or injury to persons or reasonably likely to do so 
The primary effects of cyber-attack are those on the targeted computer, network or system, 
such as alteration of software, a Distributed Denial-Of-Service (DDoS) attack, deletion or 
other cyber-attacks. Further, the secondary effects are those on the infrastructure operated by 
the targeted system or network, including both total destruction and incapacitation. Finally, 
tertiary effects are those on persons affected by the destruction or incapacitation of the 
attacked infrastructure of the system.105 It is important to note that it does not matter that these 
are not direct consequences because the ICJ stated in Nicaragua that “[i]ntervention that uses 
military armed force can occur either directly or indirectly”.106 This understanding is in line 
with the definition laid out in this thesis - extending a cyber-attack to also include damage to 
other objects. 
As previously mentioned, it is clear that a cyber-attack that “seriously injures or kills a 
number of persons or that cause significant damage to, or destruction of, property” would 
satisfy the requirement of scale and effects.107 This raises the question of whether a minor 
injury or a smaller number of killed persons or lesser destruction of property reaches the 
threshold. 
The first known case of physical damage due to a cyber-attack is the Stuxnet case. Between 
June 2009 and May 2010, the Stuxnet malware targeted the computer systems of five 
facilities located in Iran. The worm affected specific industrial control systems which use a 
type of software for management of large-scale industrial systems.108 In this case, the targeted 
industrial system was the uranium centrifuges at a nuclear plant in Natanz, Iran. The 
malicious worm was designed to force a change in the centrifuges’ rotor speed, causing the 
speed to greatly increase and then rapidly decrease, which led to excessive vibrations or 
distortions, which again led to damage in the centrifuges.109  
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When analysing if the Stuxnet-case can be identified as “use of force” is seems adequate to 
build on the scale and effects evaluation with the factors developed by the International Group 
of Experts in order to adapt it to a cyber-attack instead of conventional weapons. 
a) Severity. The damage was imposed on Iran’s nuclear program and resulted in 
such damage that it was set back several years. A cyber-attack creating 
physical damage on a nuclear plant is reasonably likely to be considered as a 
breach of the territorial integrity of the attacked State. Further, since it was a 
target of the weapon programme of Iran, which is undeniable of national 
interest and a core of their defence system, it also implies that the acts reach 
the threshold of use of force towards Iran’s political independence. On the 
other hand, the scope of the actual damage on the centrifuges appears to have 
been minor and no personnel were harmed.110  
b) Immediacy. Stuxnet consisted of several waves over a 10-month period, and 
according to this factor, it is unlikely to be viewed as a use of force.111 Further, 
once a system was infected by the malware, it is believed that the damage took 
weeks or even months to evolve.112  
c) Directness. It is beyond doubt a direct connection between Stuxnet and the 
damaged centrifuges in the Iranian nuclear plant. 
d) Invasiveness. Stuxnet targeted highly secure and sensitive computer systems113 
and the cyber-attack represent a critical intrusion on both Iranian territorial and 
political sovereignty. 
e) Measurability of effects. The effects of Stuxnet on the centrifuges of the 
nuclear plant appear both identifiable and measurable. Accordingly, this makes 
it easier to label as a use of force. 
f) Military character. The Stuxnet was targeted at a nuclear plant. The plant 
provides uranium to be used for energy, but also for nuclear weapons. This 
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means that Stuxnet targeted one of the core elements of the Iranian military, 
which insinuates that it is a breach of political independence.  
g) State involvement. No one has taken responsibility for the Stuxnet-case. 
Although not confirmed, it is widely believed that Israel and the United States 
were behind the attack.114 The vague connection between the cyber-attack and 
the attacker suggests that it cannot be considered to reach the threshold of use 
of force. 
h) Presumptive legality. The existing sanctions towards Iran are worth taking into 
account. First, the sanctions prohibit Iran from importing or exporting nuclear-
related materials and technology. If such technology or material is discovered 
outside Iran, they can be lawfully seized and destroyed.115 Second, Iran had 
been operating its centrifuges for years prior to Stuxnet,116 which was in 
violation of several UN Security Council Resolutions.117 Because of this, the 
cyber-attack on the nuclear plant may be argued as presumed legal. 
By analysing these factors, in light of the effects-based approach, the scale and effects of the 
Stuxnet-case are considered to reach the threshold of “use of force” in Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter. 
3.3.2 Cyber-attack severely disrupting critical infrastructure 
There is a disagreement in academia on whether disruptive operations, meaning those attacks 
that render ineffective or unusable infrastructures without physically damaging them, can also 
be seen as “use of force” under the UN Charter. The International Group of Experts consists 
of experts from various geopolitical backgrounds, and due to the internal disagreements 
amongst the group members, the Tallinn Manual focuses mainly on physical damage.  
Modern society is becoming heavily digitised and private individuals, corporations and 
government agencies all rely on efficient and secure computer systems. Article 2(4) contains 
attacks on territorial integrity and political independence of States, and this speaks for 
including a cyber-attack affecting a State’s security, public safety, national economic security, 
                                               
114 Fruhlinger (2017) 
115 Foltz (2012) p. 45 
116 Foltz (2012) p. 45 




the safe and reliable functioning of critical infrastructure and the availability of key 
resources.118  
There is no general agreement on what “critical infrastructure” entails. The UN General 
Assembly has stated that “[e]ach country will determine its own critical information 
infrastructures”.119 This has led to the different States creating their own understanding of 
what is critical and which sectors that are included in the definition is based on the country’s 
distinctiveness.  
For example, the 2001 US PATRIOT Act defines it as “[s]ystems and assets, whether 
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters”.120 Meanwhile, the 
Cyber Security Strategy for Germany defines critical infrastructure as “[o]rganisations or 
institutions with major importance for the public good, whose failure or damage would lead to 
sustainable supply bottlenecks, considerable disturbance of public sector or other dramatic 
consequences”, and further identifies the following areas: energy, information technology and 
telecommunications, health, transport, food, water, finance and insurance, State and 
administration, media and culture.121 By comparing these definitions, the common figure is 
that critical infrastructures are vital for national security, including governmental, societal and 
individual security.  
The case of Estonia provides a good framework for understanding this. In 2007, a Soviet war 
monument in Tallinn was supposed to be moved to a military cemetery. The statue 
symbolises the victory over Nazi-Germany, and for many Russians, it is a beloved symbol of 
wartime sacrifice. However, the Estonians mostly see the statue as a symbol of foreign 
occupation and suppression. The statue was originally scheduled to be moved on 9. May, the 
“Russian Victory Day”,122 but due to the fear of riots, the move was brought forward. In 
Tallinn, this led to a riot from several thousand protesters belonging to Estonia’s large 
population of ethnic Russians, and in Moscow, a youth movement attacked the Estonian 
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embassy, resulting in protests by NATO, the United States and the European Union.123 The 
riots towards the embassy gave in under Western pressure, but the number of cyber-attacks 
toward Estonia emerged.  
Estonia is considered to be one of the most networked countries in Europe and more than 355 
government agencies use a joint system called X-road. The initial cyber-attack consisted of 
DDoS directed at public and private internet providers, highly affecting the X-road system.124 
These attacks were, however, un-coordinated and simple to overcome. The second phase 
consisted of millions of emails sent to Parliament representatives, causing the server to crash 
and leaving the government and government agencies without communication facilities for 
days.125 The third phase completely shut down the internet in Estonia, including everything 
from news organisations, political parties to banks and companies in the public and private 
sector. On the 10th May, Estonia was near a digital collapse.126 The last large attack took place 
five days later, with a bot-network consisting of 85 000 “zombie-computers” exercising a 
DDoS towards the Computer Emergency Response Team Estonia.127 The attack on Estonia 
has later been called Web War I because it this was the first time a country has been attacked 
throughout its whole cyber domains at the same time, and there has never before been a need 
for an equally active cyber defence.128 
As stated previously, when analysing if the Stuxnet-case can be identified as “use of force” 
the evaluation will build on the scale and effects assessment with the factors developed by the 
International Group of Experts. 
a) Severity. The cyber-attack in Estonia did not inflict any loss of life or injury to 
persons. Further, there were no physical damages on infrastructure or other 
objects. However, there were economic losses due to the lack of internet access 
for the largest banks. It is also likely that the attack led to an economic loss for 
small and medium businesses that is more dependent on online-based 
communication and trade,129 in addition to impacting ordinary people and 
leaving them without living expenses. Once an attack creates repercussions for 
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ordinary people, it is likely to be considered as an influence on the political 
independence of the targeted State. The media in Estonia was also cut-off from 
reporting the attacks, both internally and externally, leading to social 
consequences for Estonians. This implies that the consequences of severity 
were extensive and might be severe enough to characterise it as “use of force”. 
b) Immediacy. Most of the consequences appeared immediately after the attacks 
began. With the computers flashing in front of them, the IT-workers were able 
to watch how their computer system was taken over, minute by minute.130 The 
continued attacks had greater scope, intensity and duration and led to severe 
consequences, as described. Some attacks lasted only for an hour or so, while 
others continued for up to between 5 and 10 hours.131 Immediately after the 
attack, the larger economic consequences were not visible, however, the social 
consequences for the smaller businesses and citizens were visible soon after 
the attack. 
c) Directness. All crashed websites and network systems were a direct result of 
the cyber-attack. The attacks consisted of hacking directly into the servers132 of 
the various government agencies where they deleted and posted Russian 
propaganda messages.133 As the bank services also were targeted, the banks 
had to upgrade their network defence systems. Since there were no other 
contributing factors, the attack led directly to the bank’s expenditures on 
upgrading the network defence system. There is direct causation between the 
attacks and the consequences mentioned in this evaluation.  
d) Invasiveness. As mentioned, Estonia is one of the most advanced network-
countries in Europe and their dependency on the internet made them extremely 
vulnerable during the attack. The attacks penetrated, in varying degrees, well-
secured domains belonging to government agencies and both private and 
public companies and is likely a breach of territorial integrity. Testimonials 
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from hackers on Russian forums134 indicate that these attacks were well-
planned, well-organised and more than just a mere frontier incident.135 
e) Measurability of effects. During the attacks, the Estonian cyber defence had an 
overview over what was affected, for how long, how the attacks were 
exercised and the number of attacks targeted at Estonia. This makes it easy to 
evaluate the number of destroyed or infected data. On the other hand, it is 
harder to measure the social and economic consequences. Some of the targeted 
banks have their losses, but it is hard to say the exact number of transactions 
lost by both banks and businesses. Because the banks were also attacked, it is 
likely that the citizens were unable to use their bank cards to buy daily 
essentials and, even worse, they were unable to get an update on why this was 
because the news channels were also affected. Thus, the cyber-attack did have 
an effect on the self-determination of the citizens of Estonia and their political 
independence. 
f) Military character. The cyber-attack was launched towards both private and 
public targets, amongst other the Computer Emergency Response Team 
Estonia, a section of the Cyber Security Intelligence of Estonia. Since Estonia 
is a highly digitised country and very reliant on technology, this implies that 
the cyber-attack can be seen as a breach of political independence because the 
cyber-attack targeted the core of the Estonian cyber military. 
g) State involvement. It is confirmed that the cyber-attacks mostly originated from 
sources outside Estonia, and the cyber-attacks were tracked to originate from 
as many as 178 different countries.136 Therefore, a State connection with the 
attacks must be evaluated. It is clear that the action of a “group acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State” is attributable to 
the State.137 Encouragement to carry out attacks was discovered on Russian 
chat forums where nationalistic and political hackers posted instructions on 
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how to conduct a cyber-attack and what the prioritised targets were.138 This 
could, however, be private individuals without a connection to the Russian 
State. On the other hand, the targets in the second and third phase were well-
constructed and organised and required significantly more financial support 
and knowledge. It is few, if any, independent groups that have these kinds of 
financial assets, which implies a close connection with the Russian 
government.139 Further, the Estonian government claimed that they could trace 
the attacks to Russian IP-addresses.140 Combined, this suggests close ties to the 
Russian authorities. Still, it is not proven beyond reasonable doubt and because 
of this, the cyber-attack cannot definitely be tied to Russia. 
h) Presumptive legality. In the beginning, the attacks appeared more as criminal 
acts and spreading of propaganda and are therefore not restricted by 
international law. However, during the continued attacks, the cyber-attacks 
gained a stronger character of power and started to attack the websites of the 
Estonian Parliament, President and Prime Minister. These attacks on central 
figures in Estonian politics is a clear violation of political independence and 
speaks strongly for the cyber-attack to amount to “use of force”. 
In sum, the cyber-attack on Estonia did not cause physical damage to property, loss of life, or 
injury to persons, but it did influence the Estonian society in other ways. The attacks did 
result in direct and partly measurable damages and did have an invasion-like character in the 
highly digitised Estonian society. Further, several of these factors are close to or clearly a 
breach of the territorial integrity and/or political independence of Estonia. By evaluating these 
factors, it is reasonable to say that the cyber-attack on Estonia can be considered as “use of 
force” under the UN Charter.  
                                               
138 Landler (2007) 
139 Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) (2010) p. 23 




4 Virtual warfare in the future 
Most of the available literature on cyber warfare focuses on cyber-attacks consisting of virtual 
attacks only. It is possible to imagine that an attack involving cyber activities carried out in 
combination with traditional use of kinetic armed force, known as hybrid warfare, can be 
likely than a solo cyber-attack.141 This sort of combined attack is more likely because a solo 
cyber-attack amounting to an armed attack, like a “Cyber Pearl Harbour”, would lead to a 
large-scale self-defence response from the attacked State.142 It would, therefore, be more 
likely that, if a State had decided to go to war, it would seek to maximise the effect by also 
using other means of attack alongside a cyber-attack.143  
Since the late 2010s, Russia has attempted to conduct this form of hybrid warfare in order to 
achieve its national strategic goals and make itself more prominent in the international 
arena.144 The Russian government has officially stated that it does not engage in offensive 
cyber activities and the official doctrinal statement on the role of the Russian military in 
cyberspace focus on prevention of information warfare.145 However, former and current 
Russian Chiefs of the General Staff have given statements about the military strategy saying 
otherwise. They have both stated that Russia has conducted hybrid warfare by focusing on 
introducing harmful software, working on domestic and foreign public opinion using the 
media and Internet and by disrupting information systems146 in combination with 
conventional attacks. 
One relevant example is the conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008. At the beginning of 
August, after months of back-and-forth accusations and a series of clashes between Georgian 
military troops and the South Ossetian militia, President Saakashvili of Georgia ordered his 
troops to capture the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali. In response, Russia moved its 
troops to the Georgian border and started to conduct air strikes on the Georgian troops in 
South Ossetia as well as Abkhazia. NATO, the United States and the United Kingdom called 
for a ceasefire, but the conflict continued for five days, resulting in Russia taking control over 
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Tskhinvali and moving their troops close to Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia.147 At the same 
time, supportive patriot hackers and/or Russian State agencies (there was no clear evidence as 
to who was responsible) exercised attacks on Georgian government websites, leading to 
inconveniences for the Georgian public and some government agencies.148 In this case, the 
cyber-attack did not cause any appreciable damage, but it is easy to imagine that if the cyber-
attack had been more large-scale and targeted at the communication system of the Georgian 
military or degrading the Georgian military weapons, it could reach the threshold of “use of 
force”, if not also constitute an “armed attack”, under the UN Charter. This case is a clear 
example of how cyber capabilities can be used alongside traditional kinetic weapons as means 
in an armed attack.  
In the case of Estonia previously mentioned in this thesis, where Russia was assumed to be 
the attacker, it is possible to imagine that the cyber-attack could be combined with a 
conventional attack. Estonia was paralysed and left without methods of communication and 
became an easy target. NATO has stated that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty can be 
invoked over cyber-attacks,149 resulting in NATO defending the attacked State against its 
attacker.150 For an attacker, there would be no point in risking this response from NATO 
without trying to maximise the result of the initial attack by conducting a hybrid attack. As a 
consequence, it can be seen as highly likely that this method of warfare will become more 
prevalent in the future when more States gain the capacity to effectively make use of cyber as 
a complement to traditional means and integrate it as a part of their operational practice. 
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